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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the components of globalization (economic integration, democratization,
and global governance networks) are changing the nature of corporate governance and the
prospects for peace.  Multinational enterprises are the instruments of economic integration.  As
such, multinationals as a group deserve credit for the positive productivity-related wealth effects
of the process.  As the implementing institution, these enterprises are also inextricably related to
the inequality--the social void--resulting from globalization that threatens peace.  
Hyper competition in the global product markets and the demands of the financial markets
determine, to a large extent, the activities of the multinational.  Alternatively, there is an evolving
opportunity for management to participate in a socially positive way with global governance
networks that are gradually assuming the regulatory role from national governments.  Within
these market and governance constraints, individual firms have an opportunity to mitigate the
negative pressures on their various constituencies thus contributing to development and the
prospect for peace.  
The paper includes a model for balancing the productive, social, and environmental role of the
enterprise.2
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The dominant forces shaping both corporate governance and peace in today’s world are those
associated with globalization.
1   Prospects for peace and the potential role for corporations in that
milieu are a function of three components of globalization--economic integration, democratiza-
tion, and global governance networks.  These forces have led to major, technologically enhanced
advancements in productivity across the world and provided new opportunities for people in
developing as well as developed countries.  At the same time, the process has contributed to the
massive global social void of inequality and insecurity.
Corporate governance is framed by the changing markets and regulatory mechanisms associated
with globalization.  The increasing efficiency of product and financial markets press enterprise
management against the regulatory representation of social and environmental needs. The
regulatory power of the nation state, particularly in developing countries, is eroding while a loose
web of global governance networks is evolving.  Multinational enterprises are involved with
many of the global governance networks and,  increasingly, the target of others.  The balance of 6
globalization pressures and the activities of multinational firms will encourage more peace or
greater conflict in our world.
This paper will trace the connectors in this process--the linkage among global markets, global
governance, and the prospects for peace, with multinational enterprise management in the
middle.
CPart I considers the global trends of the 21
st century--the global 
integration of markets, a new wave of democracy, and the evolving transfer 
of regulatory control from the nation state to global governance networks.  
CPart II raises the issue of the global social disconnect associated with
globalization.
CPart III analyzes how these trends are affecting corporate governance:
the external constraints imposed by the global system as well as the internal
direction provided by corporate boards and management, and a model for
analyzing the economic, social, and environmental tradeoffs.
CPart IV focuses on the ultimate goal of peace, how its prospects are affected 
by globalization and the role of the multinational enterprise in that process.7
I.  GLOBALIZATION COMPONENTS
A.  Globalization Drivers
Globalization is a series of international integrating factors that have swept the world since the
Second World War.  Led by economic integration, political and cultural globalization are
extensive.  This integration, unparalleled in history, is driven by dramatic technological
advancement in three interrelated areas:   information, communications, and transportation.
CInformation
The technology of the storage, access, and transmission of information is nothing short of
astounding.  The power of a computer chip, the foundation of this technology doubles every 18 to
24 months, without any increase in cost.  The cost of a megabit of storage has fallen from a 1970
cost of $5,257 to $0.17 in 1999 (HDR 2001, p.2).
CCommunications
Technology has been increasing the speed, quality, and reliability of communication at a
decreasing cost since the introduction of the first telegraph in 1837.  A doubling of
communications power every six months is predicted  (HDR 2001, p.30).
CTransportation
Dependability, quality, and cost of material transport has fundamentally changed.  “Intelligent
Transportation Systems” incorporate information and communication technology with sensing
devices to control the transport of components and products (Sussman, p.17).  
  8
Global air transport has improved dramatically especially in terms of speed and price.  These
developments tie people and markets together across national boundaries in organic networks
with interrelationships that are much tighter and deeper than those of historic trade regimes and
empires.  Citizens from warring countries visit with each other on internet chatrooms.  People
know what is happening in the far corners of the world.  Business enterprises accumulate
information about product availability and quality, as well as production costs and conditions
simultaneously in many locations.  In this kind of an electronically enhanced, information-
integrated world, national governments have found cultural, political, and economic isolation to
be impossible.  The most measurable results of these technologies is in economics--the
integration of national financial, service, and product markets.
B.  Economic Integration
Financial markets across the world are tightly integrated as a result of governmental deregulation
as well as technological advancement.  These same factors have energized the integration of
product markets at a slower but sure pace.  Multinational firms (enterprises and financial
institutions) are the implementors of this integration.
Powered by the competitive drive of financial institutions to expand worldwide, financial
markets are now virtually unbounded.  As Longworth puts it, “The global economy is powered
by global financial markets, spinning nearly $2 trillion a day around the world in a blinding flow
of electronic cash” (Longworth, p.6).  Bond yields are based upon the London Inter-Bank Offer 2Services have grown more rapidly than the trade of goods. (Baier and Bergstrand 2001b,
p.6).  The Krugman measure is underestimated in two respects: services are not included in the
trade flow variable, but are included in the measure of Gross Domestic Product.
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Rate.  Money center banks are all international lenders.  In the integration process, these markets
have become remarkably efficient on an international basis.
The best measure of integration in the product markets is the relationship between national
production and international trade, measuring the amount of global output traded among
countries.  Between 1960 and 1990, Krugman estimated that for industrial countries trade in
goods and services as a share of production (measured by Gross Domestic Product) rose from
12.5 percent to 18.6 percent--an increase of almost 50 percent (Krugman).  When the data are
adjusted to include services, trades share of output grew to about 80 percent.
2
An integrating factor of economic globalization is the separation of the production process over
several sites.  Developments in production technology have allowed the geographic decoupling
of the production process where parts and components are produced in one location, assembled
in another, and offered for sale in a third.  When these parts and components cross national
boundaries, they enter the trade statistics.  When measured as “vertical integration, the parts and 3 Vertical specialization includes three dimensions:
(1) “A good must be produced in multiple sequential stages,
(2) Two or more countries must specialize in some, but not all, stages and,
(3) At least one stage must cross an international border more than once.”
For measurement, economists would classify the first two conditions as outsourcing, while
vertical specialization would include the third (Baier and Bergstrand 2001b, p.7).
4Baier and Bergstrand (2001a) estimate that trade liberalization has had a far greater
impact than the decrease in transportation costs, accounting for 75 percent of the increase in
trades share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1960 to 1990 compared to 25 percent
explained by decreasing transportation costs.
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components have increased to 35 percent of trade and grown by roughly 115 percent compared to
the overall growth of trade estimated at 80 percent.” (Baier and Bergstrand 2001b, p.8).
3
In the process of economic integration, the key enabling factor for both product and financial
market integration has been the decision of national governments to open their markets for
foreign competition, and the privatization of State-owned enterprises as a means of competing in
the global marketplace.
4  From economies that relied basically on markets for the allocation of
resources, to the implosion of the command economics of the former Soviet Union, all have
turned to the market in some degree as the means of competing in the world economy.  While the
decisions to open markets are complex and unique to each country, and the degree of openness
covers a vast spectrum from Chile to Russia, virtually all countries are more market oriented now
than a decade ago.
Economic globalization has surely not exhausted the possibilities.  National borders still matter. 
For example, the Toronto trade with Vancouver is ten times more than its trade with Seattle11
(Keohane and Nye). With the technological drivers in place, the economic globalization process
will continue.
Multinational firms form the institutional structure through which most of the global economic
integration takes place.  Financial institutions provide the core of national and international
financial services.  The commercial, investment, and trust banking functions are central to the
operation of the international exchange, credit, bond, and national equity markets.  Multinational
enterprises (transnational enterprises, multinational corporations) are production networks that
spread across the developed and developing world.  
The opening of markets, so important to international trade, has been matched by deregulation
and laws creating a more favorable foreign direct investment climate.  From 1991 through 1999,
94 percent of the 1,035 changes in national laws were directed toward more favorable climates
(WIR 2000, p.xv).  Bilateral investment treaties increased from 181 in 1980 to 1,856 by the end
of 1999 (WIR 2000, p.xv).
The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) reflects these new, more open,  regulatory regimes. 
FDI inflows as a percent of global gross domestic capital formation have grown from 2 percent in
1979 to an impressive 14 percent in 1999 (WIR 2000, p.xvi).  In 1999 alone, overall FDI surged
16 percent and (when data become available) may well have surpassed $1 trillion in 2000.  5A rich source of information on these activities can be found in the World Investment
Report 2000: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development. 
6See Tavis 1997, pp.50-53, for discussion of the phases of industrial restructuring.
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The share of flows to developing countries has decreased, however, from 38 percent in 1997 to
24 percent in 1999 (WIR 2000, p.xvi).
Cross border mergers and acquisitions, including the acquisition of privatized government
enterprises, comprise a major component of recent FDI--a more than seven-fold increase in the
12 years from 1987 to 1999 ($100 billion to $720 billion p.xix).
5  Most of this activity is
horizontal acquisitions.  About half the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (70
percent of the value) were horizontal. The vast majority of this activity is acquisitions--97
percent.    In terms of production, the gross product of international production has grown from
one-twentieth in 1982 to one-tenth of the gross domestic product in 1999 (WIR 2000, p.xvi).
The multinational enterprise can be a marvel of production and management networks. 
Advances in production technology combine with communication and information technology to
allow for intricate worldwide  production scheduling while the new transportation systems assure
the cheap and efficient movement of parts, components, and products.
6  Product specifications
and manufacturing processes are standardized across the networks.7It has been estimated that the 300 largest multinational corporations in the world account
for one-third of world merchandise trade in their intra-firm transfers, and another one-third in
trade among these 300 firms.
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The extent of multinational geographic production diversification across countries is reflected in
the above data on vertical integration.  Intra-firm trade within the individual multinational
enterprise networks represents a substantial share of global merchandise trade--more than a
third.
7 
Standardization is also the case with managerial structures.  Firms emphasize the commonality of
the goals, policies, and procedures across their networks.  The idea of control from a central core,
however, has changed.  Managerial philosophies have shifted from hierarchical structures to
heterarchical ones.  The command and control systems typical of the post-World War II
internationalization of mass production have given way to decentralized networks.  Today’s
multinational organization consists of multiple business units (subsidiaries, affiliates) with
greater authority and responsibility, tightly linked through computerized information networks. 
In these networks, one business unit will take leadership and responsibility for a specific aspect
of the whole network, such as an individual product or the implementation of a change in
procedures.  Performance is no longer measured by the ability of business unit management to
follow headquarter decrees, but by their managerial capability to meet performance targets.  
Multinationals are also involved in ongoing coordination with other enterprises in the form of
supplier contractual networks, joint ventures, or strategic alliances, thus extending the reach of8For a discussion of joint ventures in Korea and Mexico, the relationships among the
partners and with the governments, see Kim 1988 and Jameson and Rivera 1988.
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the individual multinational network.  Supplier relationships have become more permanent for
many multinationals.  In the automobile industry, for example, there has been a shift from
numerous competing suppliers to single sourcing.  Quality control is so coordinated that the final
quality assessment function of a component is actually conducted in the contracting assembler’s 
plant.  Component production scheduling is also undertaken in many cases by the contracting
firm.  
Joint ventures are shared undertakings between two firms or a firm and the State.  Joint
ownership provides a sense of permanence although the joint venture partners remain with the
venture only so long as it continues to fill their needs.  Joint ventures between multinationals and
indigenous enterprises are prone to conflicting purposes and management control issues.
8
Strategic alliances are targeted to specific purposes, generally technology development or market
penetration.  Given the cost and complexity of technology and the rapidity with which it is
outmoded, even the large multinationals find it difficult to commit human and material resources
to such risky ventures.  In marketing, product life cycles are so short (Kline 1991) that products
need to be simultaneously introduced in many national markets.15
These coordinating activities are intended to enhance the competitive position of the individual
firm through quality and cost control, or to gain a monopolistic advantage in the product market.
C.  Spread of Liberal Democracy
In 1974, only 19 countries--one in every four--were classified as democratic.  In 1989, that
number had grown to 108.  By 2000, there were 120 countries--nearly two in three representing
two-thirds of the adult population in developing countries--were classified as electoral
democracies (Freedom House, p.111).  How is this democratization associated with globalization
and, is it sustainable?  
1.  Democratization Waves
Democracy is currently in what has been identified as its third wave (Huntington).  The first
wave commenced with the American Revolution and lasted until after World War I, when much
of Europe slipped into fascism and military dictatorship.  The second was triggered by the
decolonization, primarily in Africa, that followed World War II.  This second wave receded as
many of these newly democratic regions were replaced by dictatorships in the 1960s.  Huntington 
traces the initiation of the current third wave to democracies in Portugal, Greece, and Spain in the
1970s.
This third impetus for democracy has coincided with global market integration, although the
cause and effect relationship can be clouded.  16
The technological drivers of economic integration (information, communications, transportation)
make national borders more porous to ideas and preferences as well as to trade and investment.  
Citizens worldwide are demanding greater participation in their government.  There has also
been substantial pressure from developed country democracies, the United Nations, and its
intergovernmental (multilateral) institutions, for greater democracy in national governance
(Muravchik, pp.580-582).
This third wave of democratization was initiated by the economic success of European
unification.  “This new wave of democratization might be traced to Western Europe in the mid-
1970s.  Having developed strong domestic economies and a strongly democratic vocation, having
discarded the costly last throes of straightforward colonialism as opposed to neo-colonialism, and
having found economic strength and unity, the European Community exerted a strong pull on the
continent’s unconverted fringes” (Black, p.518).  Black attributes democracy in Latin America 
to the post-Vietnam-conflict United States, and in central/eastern Europe to the implosion of the
former Soviet Union (Black, p.518). 
2.  Islam as an Exception
An exception to the democratization trend is in Islamic countries, particularly in the Middle East. 
Indeed, in 1996, Lewis counted only one example of liberal democracy among the 53 sovereign
states that belong to the Organization of Islamic Conference, based on Huntington’s test of two
consecutive peaceful changes of government through free elections (Lewis, pp.53-54).17
In the search for an explanation, one answer is the stage of development among these countries
(Salamé, p.174).  They are poor and have a legacy of extreme differences in income and wealth. 
Their quarter century of growth, which ended in 1985, was based on extensive governmental
controls--protected markets, large governmental bureaucracies, a bias against agricultural. 
Globalization has forced these countries out of this model in much the same manner as
globalization ended Latin American State Capitalism.  These countries have stagnated
economically--as of the mid-1990s, average earnings had not increased in real terms from 1970
(Ajami, p.6).  They have been marginalized by the economic integration of the globalization
process which maintains its dependence and hold on their oil reserves.
A country’s stage of development is clearly a factor in democratization.  In assessing the
potential for democracy in Islamic countries, Soroush sets development as a necessary condition
for democracy.  “However, the primary condition for the realization of democracy is the
liberation of human beings from the elementary needs and necessities of life.  It is true that
human beings have always opposed inequity and demanded justice (democracy being a modern
manifestation of this perennial human quest), but justice can prevail only where its seekers are
not weighted down by poverty and insecurity” (Soroush, p.45). 
A factor that sets the Islamic countries apart from the other poor, marginalized post-colonial
areas in Africa and Asia is the influence of Islam on the politics of these Muslim societies.  Is
there a uniqueness in Islam as a religion or as a historic civilization that dampens or blocks9For a counter position, see Wright.
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democratization?  The separation of church and state that has evolved in the West, and its causal
factors of technologically supported modernity and secularization, pose a challenge to Islamic
states.  The Islamic tradition does not accept this separation nor its underlying factors.  This is the
core of the rejection by Islamic radicals (Woodward, p.68).   “...no Islamic state can be legitimate
in the eyes of its subjects without obeying the teachings of the Shari!a.  A secular government
might coerce obedience, but Muslims will not abandon their belief that state affairs should be
supervised by the just teaching of the holy law” (Hamdi, p.84).
9
The core issue is whether a religious democracy is possible.  Are rules governing personal and
social behavior based on divine revelation and interpreted by the state compatible with the
grassroots participatory ideal of a Western democratic state?  The idea of rights and their
correlative responsibility are fundamentally different in Islam.  Responsibility, not rights, denotes
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.  “The exercise of political power is conceived
and presented as a contract, creating bonds of mutual obligation between the ruler and the ruled
(Lewis, p.55).  In these bonds, the focus in Islam is on justice as distinct from the Western
emphasis on freedom (Lewis, p.57).  And, as Lewis notes, “Democracy usually evolves out of a
movement toward freedom” (Lewis, p.63).  
While there are strong caveats against arbitrary rule in the Islamic tradition, Islamic political
regimes throughout history have been autocratic (Lewis, p.54).  “The dominant political tradition19
has long been that of command and obedience and far from weakening it, modern times have
witnessed its intensification” (Lewis, p.55).
Notwithstanding the historical precedence, and continuing tension between the Western ideas of
religion and democracy and the teachings of Islam, the teachings on the relationship between the
ruler and the ruled do support grassroots participation so important in democracy.  The tradition
of mutual consent (shura) is central to the governing process.  “The meaning of shura is the
solidarity in society based on the principle of free consultation and genuine dialogue, reflecting
equality in thinking and expression of opinion.  Through public and private consultation, the
governor (the leader) should seek active advice and input from his followers prior to making a
decision” (Abu-Nimer, p. 256).  Sorouch argues that religion and democracy in Islamic countries
are mutually reinforcing.  He concludes one of his essays,  “This essay originated in the question
of the possibility of combining democracy and religion; but it went on to articulate their affinity
and need for each other.  Notions of liberty, faith, dynamism of religious understanding, and
rationality of worldly affairs were evoked to attest to the possibility, even the necessity, of such
an auspicious reconciliation....  A religious reign over hearts was distinguished from a legal rule
over bodies” (Sorouch, p.154).10Freedom House, for example, distinguishes between “electoral democracies” and “free”
societies, which include judgments on political rights and civil rights.  In 2000, compared to the
120 electoral democracies, there were only 85 countries who met the requirements to be
classified as “free” and 60 more who were classified as “partly free” (Freedom House).
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3.  Democracy’s Depth and Fragility
Elections are the core of democracy.  It is necessary that they take place in a free environment
with open, unfettered, informed interaction among the candidates and the populace.  The
conditions of an ideal election are not unlike those of an efficient financial market.  Still, the idea
of democracy goes well beyond the mechanics of an election.  Liberal democracy also includes 
the participation of the electors in the decisions of the elected government officials.  It implies
access to policy discussion and review through the media and other channels.
10
Extending the notion of democracy beyond election procedures embraces different conceptual,
less measurable, components and engenders substantial disagreement.  A starting point is to
define democracy in terms of existing human rights treaties.  Crawford notes, “There can be
different ideals or legitimate versions of democracy . . . international law is already seeking to
reach some agreement on an agreed minimum content of, or at least an agreed minimum standard
for, democracy.  The major human rights treaties spell out in some detail the essentials of
democracy, understood as the right of all citizens to participate in the political life of their 
societies” (Crawford, p.92).  “But in the end a democratic society, as envisaged in the human
rights treaties, is one which respects the basic rights of its members” (Crawford, p.93).21
Another approach is to define democracy in terms of freedom.  Sen notes:
Political freedoms, broadly conceived (including what are called civil rights),
refer to the opportunities that people have to determine who should govern and on
what principles, and also include the possibility to scrutinize and criticize
authorities, to have freedom of political expression and an uncensored press, to
enjoy the freedom to choose between different political parties, and so on.  They
include the political entitlements associated with democracies in the broadest
sense (encompassing opportunities of political dialogue, dissent, and critique, as 
           well as voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives) 
           (Sen, p.38).
Those who equate democracy with freedom would include Sen’s full set of instrumental
freedoms necessary to “contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely.”  In
addition to political freedoms, these include economic facilities, social opportunities,
transparency guarantees, and protective security.
A further step in plumbing the depths of democracy is to judge it by its results.  Roth imposes a
strong normative requirement to the outcome of procedural democracy.  “The moral authority
associated with the word ‘democracy’ is formidable” (Roth, p.497).  His democratic vision
includes substantive democracy with a relatively equal distribution of power over all social
decisions.  “...the primary focus of normative inquiry must be on, not formal procedures, but
social reform.  Egalitarian social policies, i.e., policies oriented toward greater economic 
equality, material security, and access to the institutions of civil society, are essential to
democracy...” (Roth, p.503).  In this sense, deepening economic inequality, material insecurity,
and social stratification are inimical to substantive democracy (Roth, p.504).22
Considering the sustainability of democracy, Huntington’s use of the term “waves” indicates his
cyclical view of the phenomenon.  Both of the first two waves did recede, with the first lasting
150 years and the second only 20.  The possibility of democracy’s sustainability depends on how
deeply one defines the term.  To anticipate a continuation of procedural democracy is very
different from Sen’s full set of instrumental freedoms, or of Roth’s substantive democracy.
Taking Latin America as an example, the third wave of democratization has witnessed but few
reversals, particularly considering the experience that concluded the second wave.  There are
disturbing signals, however.  Reporting on a recent survey undertaken by a well-respected policy
organization, the Economist reports that for the first time since the annual surveys were initiated
in 1995, the support for democracy has dropped substantially (pp.15,37,38).  A recent analysis of
Brazil emphasizes the shallow nature of that democracy and suggests that if it is to survive, it
must remain so.  According to this argument, as a democracy becomes deeper, it will threaten the
elites, who will initiate a more totalitarian regime (Weyland).  
Whatever the anticipation of democracy, shallow or deep, the future of this system of
governance, and a deepening of its impact, is far more fragile than the economic integration
component of globalization.  In the later discussion on peace, the potential relationship between
democratic governance and peace will be assessed.  It will be argued that the freedom and social
conditions of deep democracies are a necessary component for positive peace.23
D.  National Government To Global Governance
The key factor in economic integration has been the deregulation of national financial and
product markets, shifting from government-led to market-led development national governments
abrogated a substantial amount of economic control to the marketplace.  (Tavis 1997, pp.131-
148).  This process, initiated by nation states, is gradually wresting the control over a wide range 
of policies from the government to a web of interlocking global networks.  This is the transition
from “national government to international governance.”  
Keohane and Nye (p.12) define governance as follows: 
By governance, we mean the processes and institutions, both formal and informal,
that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group.  Government is the
subset that acts with authority and creates formal obligations.  Governance need
not necessarily be conducted exclusively by governments and the international
organizations to which they delegate authority.  Private firms, associations of
firms, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and associations of NGOs all
engage in it, often in association with governmental bodies, to create governance;
sometimes without governmental authority.
These networks take many forms: global institutions of the United Nations created by the
community of nation states; cross-border collaboration among individual national governmental 
groups; overlapping networks comprised of governmental, nongovernmental, and business
nodes; other private or nongovernmental networks.  24
1.  Formal Intergovernmental Institutions
International affairs are guided by a plethora of bilateral and multilateral agreements among
nation states.  Between 1946 and 1975, the number of these agreements more than doubled from
6,351 to 14,061 (Held et al, p.53).  These agreements, extensive as they are, do not have the
characteristics of national government.  The intergovernmental organization that most closely
resembles the sovereign nation state is the European Union. The United Nations and its 16
specialized agencies have many of the attributes of government: They are created by agreement
among most national governments at that time; they have decision making power; their
continuance is conditioned on acceptance by the membership.  A growing force is the cross-
border collaboration among the domestic judiciary, regulatory agencies, and officials.  
a.  United Nations and Related Intergovernmental Multilateral Institutions
The governance role of the United Nations has been described by Väyrynen as follows:  
“In theory, the United Nations is the umbrella organization for global
governance....  However, judged by more demanding standards, the U.N. 
role in global governance has remained limited, with the exception of some 
peace-keeping and peace-building operations, and development programs.  
In particular, in the governance of the global economy, the impact of the U.N. 
and its headquarters has been modest.  Neither have the bodies it has directly
created, such as UNCTAD and UNIDO, been able to gain global influence of 
any consequence.  The responsibility of economic governance has been on the
shoulders of international organizations, such as the IBRD and the IMF, which 
are only indirectly--or not at all--linked with the United Nations. (Väyrynen
2001, p.12)
The U.N. is taking three new directions, as identified by Väyrynen, that promise a major impact
on global governance.  “Under the leadership of Kofi Annan, the U.N. has taken a new tack that11The United Nations outreach to the business community is in terms of a Global
Compact.  “The Global Compact is founded upon the common ground shared by the United
Nations and the global business community....  By helping to protect and promote universal
values, the private sector can help the United Nations make a persuasive case for the open global
market” (see www.unglobalcompact.org).
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seems to have three distinct elements; (a) a new philosophy of globalization; (b) the search of
new solutions to old global dilemmas; and (c) a new approach to transnational corporations”
11 
(Väyrynen 2001, p.13).
These three directions, and the reappointment of Kofi Annan as Secretary General hold promise
for global governance.  Beyond that, some proposals for modification would expand the authority
of the U.N., moving it closer to a governmental body.  Recommendations to include a global
central banking function, taxation on global transactions with redistribution of the proceeds, or a
bicameral General Assembly would move the activities of the U.N. closer to those of a global
government (Keohane and Nye, p.13).
Three U.N.-related agencies are central to global governance: the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The governance roles
of each are changing.  As a result of the financial crises in the 1990s, the IMF added an economic
development agenda to its chartered role of global monetary stability.  Through the imposition of
economic conditions as a prerequisite for stabilization loans, the IMF forced acceptance of
market discipline and fiscal responsibility on borrowing countries.  More recently, the IMF has
increased its interactions with social movements.  Nevertheless, Higgott, Underhill, and Bieler26
report, “While the increasing exchanges have led to some attention to the social dimension of
structural adjustment programs and to some democratisation of the Fund’s policy in the form of
greater transparency, there is still a long way to go toward a fully democratic dialogue”  (Higgott,
Underhill, and Bieler, p.11).
The World Bank is attempting to include ecological and poverty reducing considerations into its
loan and investment efforts along with expanded contacts with social movements and greater
transparency in its new information disclosure policy (Williams, Marc).  These programs are a
renewal of the “basic human needs” policy of the bank under the McNamara presidency.  The
emphasis is evident in the opening sentence of the WDR 2000/2001:  “Poverty amid plenty is the
world’s greatest challenge.  We at the bank have made it our mission to fight poverty with
passion and professionalism, putting it at the center of all the work we do”  (p.v).  This report is
based on 60,000 interviews conducted by the World Bank in the poverty areas of 60 countries.
The WTO emerged as an institution from its GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs)
predecessor with greater authority in conflicts over trade due to its stronger rules on dispute
settlement (Gagné).  Still, the WTO retains some of the basic problems with GATT:  The
developing countries do not believe they are adequately represented; negotiations take place in
secret; environmental, worker, and other social groups believe their interests are ignored.  The
central issue for the WTO is whether it will provide the mechanism for globalizing social 
concerns, or be a barrier to their enforcement.  27
Biosafety is testing the position.  Biosafety is the effort to control the potential risk of
biotechnology and its products.  A number of subsidiary agreements of the WTO presently
include biosafety provisions:  The Sanitary and Phystosanitary Agreement, Technical Barriers to
Trade Agreement, and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement.  The
Biosafety Protocol, a recently enacted international treaty is intended to regulate the labeling and
testing of genetically modified food for international commerce.  These Living Modified
Organisms (LMOs) are food crops that have been genetically modified to increase their
productivity or their resistance to pests and diseases (UNEP News Release, p.3).  The Protocol
gives national governments the right to restrict imports of LMOs if they conclude that these
products could endanger health or threaten the environment (Environment News Service). 
Opposition to the Protocol by the multinational producers of LMOs has been based on the
argument that it restricts world trade.  They are looking for intellectual property protection for
biological resources (UNEP News Release, p.4).  The Protocol will become an issue for the
WTO when a country blocks an import based on the Protocol.
b.  Cross Border Governmental Relationships
The numbers and density of international relationships among domestic governmental
institutions have increased in recent years.  These forms of governmental collaboration are tied to
democracy in that governmental institutional collaboration across borders are more common
among liberal democratic market economies (Slaughter, p.220).  Judicially there is cross-
fertilization of decisions, cooperation in dispute resolution, and judicial organizations (Slaughter,28
pp.204-214).  Governmental agencies increasingly collaborate in the area of securities regulation,
banking and insurance supervision, criminal law enforcement, environmental policy, and anti-
trust policy (Slaughter, pp.214-218).  There is substantial give and take in these interactions.  The
strains of the anti-trust process were recently evidenced by the different reaction of the United
States Department of Justice and the European Union Competitive Commission in response to
the proposed General Electric acquisition of Honeywell (Hargreaves and Spiegel).  
2.  Private Network Involvement
With globalization, private institutions have become a significant factor in global governance. 
There are two broad institutional components in this civil society--the business enterprise and the
nongovernmental organization.  These institutions differ in their treatment under the law, their
purpose as assigned by society and defined by the institution, transparency, and accountability. 
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
The change in the business sector has been the growth of the multinational firms.
a.  Business Network Initiatives
The global reach of intra-firm multinational organizational linkages and inter-firm contractual
combinations, such as the international subcontracting networks, joint ventures, and strategic
alliances outlined above are, themselves, forms of global governance.  These combinations are
attempts to enhance a firm’s competitive position by displacing market mechanisms.  29
Other examples of inter-firm cooperation are directed to rationalizing the market in order to
assure its smooth functioning on desired corporate terms, through standards setting, rule making,
and the organization of industrial sectors (Cutler 1999b, p.4).  Given the rapidity of technological
change and the associated potential for market turbulence, multinational enterprises join together
in these networks, generally participating with governmental institutions and often with non-
governmental organizations, in order to gain information, decrease the cost of commercial errors,
and attempt to reduce some of the market uncertainty.
A case of international regulation developing from a small core of business executives is the
World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement (TRIPS). 
The CEOs of 12 multinational enterprises formed the Intellectual Property Committee.  Enlisting
support from executives in Europe and Japan, and working through governmental trade
representatives, this small group orchestrated a far-reaching global regulation on intellectual
property rights.  As Sell notes: “TRIPs is not merely an incremental change in international
regulation, but rather the embodiment of a new ‘constitutive principle’ insofar as it creates new
international property rights that create or define new forms of behaviour and generate
structures.” (Sell, p.92).
Substantial efforts have been devoted to international standards.  A powerful network is the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  Members of the ISO come from national
standards boards.  Some of these boards are governmental, while others are private.  The U.S.12In the apparel industry, Mattell has formulated 200 standards as part of its Global
Manufacturing Principles (Sethi, p.91).  The firm has commissioned the Mattell Independent
Monitoring Council to audit these principles in developing country factories where Mattell
products are produced, both those owned by Mattell and those subcontracting Mattell production.
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representative, for example, The American National Standards Institute, is a federation of
business, government, other standards groups, labor, consumers unions, and academics.  The
ISO-9000s Quality Management standards and the ISO-14000s Environmental Management 
standards reflect major industrial input.  This is an important example of intense business
involvement with civil society and governmental groups.  
Another important set of business related networks focuses on social and environmental
responsibilities.  The purpose of these networks is not to enhance the efficiency of markets, but
to promote corporate objectives beyond productivity, efficiency and wealth control.  These
networks can be motivated by an attempt to forestall external regulation, to protect and enhance
the industry’s reputation and the brand image of its members, or from a sense of social
responsibility.  Standardization of social behavior is the analogue of product and quality
standards.
12  Objectives are articulated as aspirational statements in the form of corporate credos,
statements of values, or as specific guidelines in detailed codes of ethics/conduct (Murphy 1998). 
A 1995 study of U.S. firms indicated that 34 percent of those surveyed had a formal written
credo, 53 percent a statement of values, and 91 percent a code of ethics/conduct (Murphy 1995). 
Among non-U.S.-based multinationals, however, less than 50 percent have a formal written
ethics statement (Murphy 1998, p.xiv).  13The code of conduct movement is substantial.  For a collection of individual ethics
statements (including credos, value statements, and codes of ethics/conduct), see Murphy,
80 Exemplary Ethics Statements.  For a summary of global codes, see Williams, Global Codes of
Conduct: An Idea Whose Time Has Come.  This volume includes copies of 27 international
codes.  
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International networks are a logical extension of these individual corporate efforts.
13  An example
of an international statement of aspirations is the Caux Round Table (CRT).  The CRT was
founded in 1986 by a group of senior executives from Europe, Japan, and North America.  The
Caux Principles for Business were published in 1994 and have been implemented in dozens of
firms.  The principles are a living document in that the CRT continues to meet on a regular basis,
and are finding increasing acceptance by non-CRT members who recognize its basis in corporate
leadership (Cavanagh, p.175).  There are two concerns with the Caux Principles:  They are too
general, and there is no enforcement provision (Cavanagh, p.179).  Specific codes of conduct
address both of these concerns.  
An example of a code-based monitoring-enforced network consisting of multinationals,
universities, and advocacy groups is the Fair Labor Association (FLA).  The FLA grew out of the
White House Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP), a unique combination of government, business,
labor, and other NGOs convened by former President Clinton and charged to end the sweatshop
conditions in the apparel industry.  The Partnership issued a Workplace Code of Conduct and
Principles of Monitoring.  The Partnership also designed the Fair Labor Association as the
mechanism for certifying and supervising independent monitors.  Commenting on the monitoring
process, Schilling notes: 14A smaller network, the Global Alliance for Workers and Communities, is an unusual
combination of corporations such as Gap and Nike, a multilateral institution (World Bank),
universities (St. John’s and Penn State), cooperating organizations (Atma Jaya University
Research Institute of Indonesia, the Center for Economic Studies and Applications in Vietnam,
the Chalalongkom University Social Research Institute in Thailand), and others to survey
workers and study working conditions in the apparel industry (Global Alliance for Workers and
Communities).
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“The AIP had serious, often heated, discussions about independent monitoring: Who 
will do it and how it will be administered (Schilling, p.234).  As the structure moved 
from the AIP to the FLA, disagreements over monitoring led the labor representatives 
and some of the human rights groups to drop out.
The FLA is currently the most active group monitoring conditions in apparel manufacturing
plants across the world.
14   Membership consists of 11 major brand marketers, five NGOs, and
158 colleges and universities.  While the FLA is diverse in membership, and global in coverage,
its institutional members are all headquartered in the United States.  
An example of a broader international membership network is drawn from the chemical industry. 
The “Responsible Care” program developed by the Canadian Chemical Manufacturers
Association sets standards for the handling of chemicals.  These standards are being broadly
implemented, with much encouragement from developing country governments.  The
International Counsel of Chemical Associations (ICCA), consisting of national chemical
associations, has been instrumental in formulating their own standards beyond those set by the
ISO.  Many of these restrictions were set in conjunction with Greenpeace and are reflected in the
Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS), which grew out of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (Haufler, p.128).  As Haufler notes, “This reflects15For a discussion of nonprofit, nongovernmental NGOs and civil society, see Tavis 2000,
pp.22-26 and note 6, p.31.
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a complicated inter-relationship among the members of a private sector regime (ICCA) and other 
nongovernmental organizations (Greenpeace) and governmental institutions (IFCS and
individual governments)” (Haufler, p.129).  
Through these kinds of networks, business has a voice in the rules and guidelines of the global
economy.
b.  Nongovernmental Organizations
NGOs (more precisely defined as nonprofit, nongovernmental entities) have flourished in the
industrialized world for a long time.  They have become a force in developing countries since the
1960s, paralleling the process of globalization.  Organizationally, NGOs cover a broad spectrum
including development nongovernmental organizations, professional associations, producers’
organizations, social movements, labor unions, religious groups (congregations, orders, or base
communities), and even the mass media (Reilly, pp.176-180).
15  The diversity of NGOs is
captured by the Commission on Global Governance: “Some are issue-oriented or task-oriented;
others are driven by ideology.  Some have a broad public interest perspective; others have a more
private, narrow focus.  They range from small, poorly funded, grassroots entities to large, well-
supported, professionally staffed bodies.  Some operate individually; others have formed34
networks to share information and tasks and to enhance their impact”  (Commission on Global
Governance, p.254).
In terms of governance, there is a distinction between indigenous and international NGOs.  Most
indigenous groups are grassroots organizations.  Firmly rooted in the local communities, these
groups are organized to serve the specific interests of their members, or for general community
support.  Fisher estimates that there are over 200,000 of these indigenous NGOs in the
developing world alone (Fisher, p.6).  Indigenous NGOs are a remarkably diverse group.   Many
are very much a part of the democratization process.  Through them, people are participating in
local governance.  Associated with the process of national deregulation and democratization,
national governments are moving decision authority from national to regional and local levels
(the process of devolution).  This shift from typically strong central governments and relatively
large staffs in developing countries to the unprepared, understaffed, and largely under-funded
units of local government creates a leadership void and opportunity for local NGO participation.  
Other NGOs operate on an international level.  These groups generally seek legitimization
through association with indigenous NGOs, and are often the source of financial, information,
and strategic support for their grassroots associates.  International NGOs provide more aid than
the whole U.N. system (Keohane and Nye, p.22).  The Commission on Global Governance
counts 28,900 of these NGOs with operations in three or more countries (Commission on Global
Governance).  Many of these international NGOs are human rights advocates that have been able35
to challenge national governments.  “In effect, these human rights NGOs represent a distinct kind
of transnational social movement which in many national contexts is regarded as radical both in
terms of its espousal of individual rights and in its claim to defend the autonomy of civil society
against the possible dictates of the state”  (Held et al, p.67).
The participation of NGOs in networks with business and governments is reflected in the above
examples.  NGO administrations, however, are often hesitant to join in these forms of
collaboration.  Many are in the nonprofit sector due to a disdain for business, or a fear of being
compromised and used for public relations purposes.  Human rights advocacy groups, in
particular, have been confrontational in their interactions with the business sector through their
“name and shame” strategies.  The organization of the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC) is an
example.  This student-initiated group grew out of a distrust for the Fair Labor Association.  The
WRC organizers are convinced that business interests will dominate the FLA and be more
concerned in promoting corporate image than improving conditions for the worker.  Initially, the
WRC demanded that universities cancel their membership in the FLA before joining the WRC.  
The potential contributions of both international and indigenous NGOs are substantial.  Still, the
rules of the game are not as well established for NGOs as they are for either governments or the
private business sector.  For government, there are the rights and responsibilities of the
sovereign.  For the private business sector, there is the acceptance of competition as the driving
force within the legitimate regulatory constraints, with legally required transparency and36
accountability.  NGOs are largely self-appointed within loose legal structures.  They are
essentially accountable only to their supporters.  NGOs lack the status of the sovereign and are
not quite sure whether confrontation, collaboration, or competition should guide their activities
with their fellow NGOs or with the other two sectors.
3.  Transparency:  Accountability:  Legitimacy:  Authority
Open, effective functioning of a system is based on the necessary determining causal sequence of
transparency, accountability, legitimacy, and authority.  Each is a necessary prerequisite for the
next.  
At the beginning of the sequence, transparency and accountability are in short supply across the
world.  As noted, NGOs do not have the legislated transparency nor the structured accountability
of the business enterprise.  These features are as varied as the NGOs themselves.  While the
business enterprise is subjected to the transparency requirements of public financial reporting and
accountability to the owners, these prerequisites for legitimacy are limited by their financial
purpose.  Social (including environmental) audits are a growing component of accounting
engagements, but they are not standardized and are made public only at the discretion of the
enterprise.  The King Report calls for public disclosure in three areas:  economic, social, and
environmental (The King Report, p.109).  37
Legitimate authority can be based on an effective democratic form of government where the
governed accept the authority of the elected officials.  It can be assigned to international
networks by these governments.  The European Union and the United Nations come the closest
to meeting the requirement of assigned authority.  Governmental cross-border networks are
attempts to gain input into international regulation that will affect the country.  These are logical
extensions of national policies to international levels.  Through involvement in mixed
government/private networks, national governments attempt to influence the network and to gain
access to information and technology that is more available in the private sector.  Multinational
firms and NGOs seek governmental involvement for legitimacy and authority.  Beyond
legitimacy anchored by national governments, global governance networks must earn legitimacy
and authority based on transparency and accountability.
In a governing sense, legitimacy can exist without the procedural basis of democracy.  As with
democracy, however, non-elected networks are judged on their “effectiveness in producing
valued outputs” (Keohane and Nye, p.34).
Cutler et al described the notion of private governance in terms of authority.  
We suggested that authority consists of decision-making power over an issue area
that is generally regarded as legitimate by participants.  We also stipulated that
authority need not be associated with government institutions, but can be
associated with firms.  The legitimacy of firm or corporate authority, in turn,
derives from the deference of participants flowing from their shared perceptions
of corporate expertise, historical practices that legitimate corporate authority, or
from an explicit or implicit grant of authority by states.  Furthermore, we assume
that such authority is somehow different from interfirm cooperation and we38
posited that cooperative relations can be transformed into authoritative relations
when they become infused with an obligatory quality (1999c, p.362).
Further, they state: “Authority, by definition, operates through a sense of obligation rather than
coercion, one of its distinctive features that makes it particularly suited to the analysis of
international affairs where enforcement capacity is weak” (p.359).  Only to the extent that these
global governing institutions and networks embody legitimacy and authority can they serve as a
reasonable substitute for the diminishing policy freedom of the nation state.16Technological change is a key component of growth.  “Cross-country studies suggest
that technological change accounts for a large portion of differences in growth rates” (HDR 2001,
p.29).
39
II.  THE SOCIAL VOID
The technological drivers of globalization, and the resulting components of the process, have
contributed to an increase in productivity across the world.
16  Kofi Annan observes:
“The benefits of globalization are plain to see: faster economic growth, higher living
standards, accelerated innovation and diffusion of technology, and management skills, 
new economic opportunities for individuals and countries alike” (Annan, p. 9).
The same technological factors that so effectively drive the positive results of globalization are
also creating social fractures.  The spread of technology has been uneven.  As measured by the
United Nations Development Program, “More than three-quarters of internet users live in high-
income OECD countries, which contain 14% of the world’s people (HDR 2001, p.40).  Studies
suggest that, for most countries, internet users are generally located in specific urban areas, are
more educated and wealthy, are young, and are male.  There are indications that some of these
disparities, such as the male dominance, are decreasing although the spread of internet usage in
developing countries will be limited by the slowing diffusion of electricity and telephone
mainlines across the world (HDR 2001, pp.40-41).  Transportation technology is irrelevant to
large segments of society, for those struggling with inadequate local infrastructure, or those
without goods to transport internationally.  40
The fruits of the technologically enhanced productivity are also unevenly distributed and have
created the sense of a faceless, amoral market that drives for productivity with no capability of
concern for those participating in, or excluded by, the process.  Increasingly, efficient local
markets offer consumer and investors more informed choices.  While human interactions provide
the fabric of the market and trust is a necessary component of contracts, the overall result is seen
as an unfettered force--a market with no soul.  The vast number of individual and institutional
transactions in the marketplace move it beyond the control of all but the most powerful and
determined governments and governance networks.  
While social fractures have been associated with major technological breakthroughs throughout
history (the invention of gunpowder, the industrial revolution, for example), the interconnected-
ness and rate of change with current technology is unprecedented.  Globalization has led to a
crisis mentality.  The integrated information of financial markets has allowed the flight of capital
and currency crises to move quickly from one country to another; organized crime thrives on
communications technology; economic cycles are closely connected among countries; the
economic rate of change makes people more vulnerable.  The resulting tensions have erupted in
meetings of multilateral institutions and economic summits from Seattle to Genoa.  In spite of
the anarchist-provoked confrontations, the size, diversity, and message of the other
demonstrators reflect the social void associated with globalization.  The potential for peace in
today’s world depends on our ability to introduce social and environmental concerns into the41
marketplace.  As Rodrik notes, “The broader challenge for the 21
st century is to engineer a new
balance between market and society” (Rodrik 1997, p.85).  
At core, the social void results from a lack of concern for human rights in the system, hence, the
starting point in the analysis.  The denial of human rights that underlies the distribution of wealth
and the broader dimensions of human development will be assessed.  If human rights are to be
supported, it falls to the institutions that implement the market and its regulation.  The possibility
of institutions leaning against the market and collapsing the void are discussed in the final
section.
A.  The Human Rights Core
The legitimate core of the social void is the lack of concern for the human rights of major
segments of society.  Unfortunately, genuine concerns for the violation of human rights too often
gets buried in the pursuit of self interest and political agendas.
Human rights begins with respect for the dignity of the person as an individual or as a member of
a community (Tavis, forthcoming, pp.14-16).  The concept of the nature and breadth of human
rights is subject to interpretation and continually evolving.  Rights are often expressed in terms of
generations.  The first generation of human rights was established by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights followed later by the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 
These rights are often termed “negative liberties”--the rights of the individual against the State. 17Amnesty International is facing these same difficulties as it considers extending its
mandate to include second generation rights.
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Although there is some cost to assuring these rights such as ensuring a fair vote, their protection
is relatively inexpensive.  First generation rights do not conflict with one another (Sohoni 2001a, 
p.9).  They are widely supported in national law.  The clear definition and characteristics of first
generation rights help to explain the international success of the NGO human rights advocacy
networks such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch.
The second generation of human rights, encoded in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, dramatically expands the definition.  While many national
regulations support these rights, particularly in welfare states, these second generation rights have
received only modest recognition in the constitutions of modern Western cultures (Tavis 1997,
pp.427-428 note 4).  They require substantial, proactive effort on the part of the State; protecting
these rights can be very expensive; they can readily contradict one another thus requiring
tradeoffs; they are difficult to define; they easily become politicized.  As Sohoni states,
“...arguments over social and economic policy are the stuff of party politics” (2001a, p.9).
17  
Still, some of these second generation rights such as the right to subsistence are unarguably
“fundamental” (Shue).
Third generation rights are termed the “rights of solidarity.”  They “confer entitlements not on
individuals per se but on the collectives to which they belong, usually identified with ‘peoples’”18For an excellent discussion of third generation rights, see the UNESCO book of essays
entitled Human Rights in a Pluralist World: Individuals and Collectivities (Berting 1990).
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(Berting et al, p.viii).  The most common rights addressed in this category are the rights to
development and to peace.  There is a good deal of debate over the collective nature of the third
generation rights.  Some observers argue that it is too much of an extension of the notion of 
rights.  Others point out that all human rights have a collective dimension and argue that
codification of the third generation will reinforce the first two (Flinterman, p.79).
18   
All rights have their correlative duties.  The institutions involved in the market and its regulation
have the duty to avoid the deprivation of these rights through their actions, and to help protect
against deprivation caused by the action of others (Donaldson, p.86).    Of major importance to
corporate governance, multinational firms link the economic, social, and cultural rights of their
constituents across the world.
B.  Associated Wealth Effects
Global economic integration has led to major wealth effects.  Human rights impose a moral
dimension to these effects.  
The positive average wealth effects during the period of globalization are clear.  In the 22 years
between 1975 and 1997, global real per capita income increased substantially.  Both developed
and developing countries shared in this growth, with industrialized countries gaining 53 percent19The numbers do not include Eastern Europe and the CIS countries, HDR 1999, p. 154.
20The Gini coefficient is the mean difference of income in the population.  A Gini
coefficient of one would indicate the maximum possible degree of inequality where one
household had all of the income.  A Gini of zero would indicate that there is no inequality, that
incomes were equally distributed.
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from a base of $12,589 in 1975) and developing countries gaining 51 percent (from a base of
$600).
19   Between 1965 and 1998, average incomes more than doubled in developing countries
(World Development Report 2000/2001, p. vi). 
The maldistribution of these wealth effects is equally clear. The absolute gaps in income among
countries have increased.  In terms of GDP per capita, the gap of OECD countries over even the
high growth East Asian and Pacific countries has more than doubled (HDR 2001, pp.16-17). 
Another view is to look at the extremes.  In 1970 the ratio of income per capita for the world’s
richest 10 percent compared to the poorest 10 percent was 19.4 to one.  By 1997 this ratio had
increased to 26.9 to one (HDR 2001, p.17).  As measured by the Gini coefficient (a standard
measure of inequality) household surveys indicate that between 1988 and 1993 dispersion has
increased dramatically.  “The World Gini coefficient was 65.9 in 1993, an increase on 62.5 in
1988 (in $PPP).  The implied increase of about 0.7 Gini points per year is very high”(Milanovic,
p.40).
20  
The economic dislocation associated with economic globalization and reflected in the dispersion
of wealth is tied to the rate of change of the process.  The rapidity with which markets have45
opened, the intensity of the competition for a place in the market, all driven and supported by
technological development, create enormous opportunities for those who have access and can
cope with the globalizing institutions, but exploitation and marginalization for those who cannot. 
Väyrynen states, “As a rule, actors controlling specific, mobile and tradable resources benefit
from globalization, while those stuck to fixed assets that are not competitive in the international
market see their incomes decrease” (Väyrynen, forthcoming, p.235).  As noted above, the future
of access to technology in developing countries as a means of gaining access to the economic
system is not promising.  
In statistical terms, the expected value of the distribution of income and consumption has
increased as well as its standard deviation.  The distribution moved to the right at the same time
it broadened.  Wealth (or income) poverty can be represented as a threshold at the lower tail of
this distribution.  With globalization, the improvement in the mean has been great enough to
offset most of the increase in dispersion, thus modifying the effect of this dispersion on the poor. 
The World Bank notes: “As countries become richer, on average the incidence of income poverty
falls” (WDR 2000/2001, p.45).  The threshold of absolute poverty is often defined as living on
less than $1 a day.  By this measure the share of global population living in poverty has
decreased from 28.3 percent in 1987 to 24.0 percent in 1998.  The absolute number has increased
only slightly from 1,183.2 million to 1,198.9 million (WDR 2000/2001, p.23).  Nevertheless, a
fifth of the world’s population presently live on less than $1 a day (WDR 2000/2001, p.3). 46
Clearly, poverty is a violation of human rights--of the right to subsistence.  Only the most ardent
supporters of unfettered markets would disagree with this right, although they might want to
defer it until the growth benefits of globalization “trickle down.”
The morality of the increasing global dispersion of income and wealth is more controversial.  The
observed dispersion is not itself immoral.  Much of it is a function of effort and skills.  The moral
consideration enters in terms of a second generation right of usable access to the resources
necessary to enhance one’s economic position.  This includes access to the economic system and
to the education necessary to take advantage of that access.  It is the discrimination, exploitation,
marginalization, and denial of opportunity which contribute to the dispersion that is immoral.
C.  Associated Human Development
Human development is broader than income and wealth.  It involves health, education, food and
nutrition, the inclusion of women and children, the environment, and security.  As with
productivity and wealth, there has been dramatic progress in these dimensions of human
development, but with a huge remaining gap.  The dramatic progress and the enormity of the
remaining gap are present in Table 1.   21“The HDI measures the overall achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of
human development--longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living.  It is measured by
life expectancy, educational attainment (adult literacy and combined primary, secondary, and
tertiary enrollment) and adjusted income per capita in purchasing power party (PPP) US dollars. 
The HDI is a summary, not a comprehensive measure of human development” (HDR 2001,
p.14).
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Advances in human development can be measured by the United Nations Development
Program’s human development index.
21  A comparison of people in index categories between
1975 and 1999 shows an overall improvement, and the large numbers of people moving to a
higher index status (HDR 2001, p.11).
Human development is inextricably tied to human rights.  The United Nations Human
Development Report notes, “In short, human development is essential for realizing human rights,
and human rights are essential for full human development” (HDR 2000, p.2).  Both can be
expressed in terms of freedom, “Human freedom is the common purpose and common
motivation of human rights and human development” (HDR 2000, p.2).
The United Nation’s Development Program (UNDP) follows Sen in outlining the goals of human
development and human rights in terms of freedoms.  Sen poses five instrumental freedoms
including the political freedom necessary for democracy.  These freedoms that will lead to
“capabilities of persons to lead the kind of lives they value--and have reason to value” (Sen,
p.18).  
“Political freedoms, broadly conceived (including what are called civil rights), refer to
the opportunities people have to determine who should govern and on what principles48
...they include the political entitlements associated with democracies in the broadest
sense (encompassing opportunities of political dialogue, dissent and critique as well as
voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives” (quoted earlier:
p.38).
“Economic facilities refer to the opportunities individuals respectively enjoy to utilize
economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or exchange” (p.39).
“Social opportunities refer to the arrangement society makes for education, health care
and so on which influence the individual’s substantive freedom to live better.  These
facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a
healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for
more effective participation in economic and political activities” (p.39).
“Transparency guarantees deal with the need for openness people can expect:
the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity....
These guarantees have a clear instrumental role in preventing corruption, financial
irresponsibility and underhand dealings” (pp.39-40).
“Protective security is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected
population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and
death” (p.40).
Two common characteristics of these freedoms are economic accomplishment and participation--
the denial of which are central to the social disconnect and factors with which the multinational
firms are closely associated.  
It is the denial of these freedoms and the limited inclusion of the voices who would represent
them that expands the social void and threatens the prospects for peace.  Democratization is,
clearly, a positive development.  The representation of NGOs and multinational firms in global
governance networks has expanded the scope of participation but with powerful, nondemocratic
institutions.  The tension over the void is due to the exclusion of the less powerful voices in the
globalization process:  developing countries, labor, environmental groups, the under- and un-49
employed, the marginalized, and the many who are frightened by the dizzying rate of change in
the globalizing economy.
D.  Possibility of Narrowing the Void
Thus, the period of globalization has been associated with great overall advancement in human
development, but has seen increasing maldistribution of globalization’s progress and bypassed
major pockets of poverty.   The maldistribution of human development existed before
globalization. The real failure of globalization is that it has not lived up to its potential.  Clearly,
unfettered markets are uninterested and incapable of enhancing human rights and human
development beyond the mechanics of productivity and wealth.  Protection of human rights and 
advances in human development will depend on national governments, global governance
networks, and the activities of the multinational firms themselves.  
1.  National Sovereignty, the Market, and Global Governance
In the process of stimulating economic globalization, national governments passed much of the
control over the allocation of resources in their countries from the control of regulators to the
uncontrolled marketplace--from governmental to market-led development, as noted earlier.  The
result:   As economic globalization progresses, the policy freedom of the nation state declines.  
Often referred to as a “loss of sovereignty” this shift in power has been an issue of extensive
debate.  Ohmae and Guehenno, for example, declare the “end of the nation state” (Ohmae 1995;50
Guehenno 1995).  Others claim that globalization has actually led to enhanced activities on the
part of national governments, at least among the developed countries.  “Indeed, in all the
domains surveyed, it is evident that in key respects many States, but most especially SIACS
[states in advanced capitalistic societies] have become more active, although the form and
modalities of this activism differ from those of previous eras” (Held et al, p.436).  Their
conclusion is partially based on global governance networks:
“Contemporary globalization is also a highly contested process since the infrastructures
and institutionalization of global politics generate new arenas and mechanisms through
which conflicts over the terms of global interaction are played out--from the corridors of
the European Commission and dispute panels of the WTO to the alternative G7 summits of
NGOs and annual meetings of the ILO.  In this respect, contemporary globalization does
not, as many hyperglobalizers argue, necessarily narrow the scope for political actions and
state initiatives but, on the contrary, may dramatically expand it, as the discussion in earlier
chapters of the politicization and regulation of economic, cultural and ecological global-
ization suggests” (Held et al, p.437).
In the shift from national government to the intergovernmental networks, Slaughter claims that
the State is disaggregating, not disappearing.  
From this perspective the State is not disappearing; it is disaggregating.  Government
officials and institutions participating in transnational government networks represent the
interests of their respective nations, but as distinct judicial, regulatory, executive, and
legislative interests.  They respond to and interact with the growing host of non-State
actors; they can link up with their sub-State and supranational counterparts.  This dis-
aggregation provides flexibility and networking capacity while preserving the fundamental
attributes of capital Statehood--links to a defined territory and population and a monopoly
on the legitimate use of force.  That is the core of State power, power that remains indis-
pensable for effective government at any level” (Slaughter 2000, p.200).
In this sense, transgovernmental networks themselves and State agencies participating in mixed
government/nongovernmental networks will strengthen the State in the international system,
although in a new, less homogenous, and probably less coordinated manner.22The loss of policy freedom exacerbates the problem for national regulation of an
international institution.  The control of the State is limited to the local operation of a
multinational enterprise--the local business unit.  The local unit can readily bypass governmental
controls through its extensive connections with the multinational enterprise.  In strategic
alliances, for example, the fluid horizontal relationships among competing firms changes the
nature of competition making the antitrust dimension of regulation even more complex.    
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Väyrynen sees the relationship between globalization and sovereignty in the international
structure.  
“Globalization is not an alternative to sovereignty, but it rather provides a new context in
which it is embedded....  In the future, a state will be less of a corporate actor and more of 
a decisional arena in which various forces meet to resolve national and transnational
problems.  Sovereignty remains the dominant organizing principle of international
relations, but politics and decision making become more diverse and complex.  Networks,
coalitions, and transactions between states become new units of analysis” (Väyrynen,
forthcoming, p.234).  
He addresses the loss of policy freedoms in terms of agenda setting power. 
 “Sovereignty is not disappearing, but its nature is changing.  The globalization process 
has lowered national barriers and transaction costs, leading to a closer integration of
national and international societies.  As a result of this development, the agentive power 
of the state has declined, or has become more strongly conditioned by the State’s
relationship with domestic and transnational social and economic forces” (Väyrynen, 
forthcoming, p.243).
As with Slaughter and Held et al, Väyrynen stresses the importance of the international
governance networks, particularly those he identifies as the “Transnational Social Movements”
of civil society (Väyrynen, forthcoming, p.239).
This loss of agenda-setting power applies to developed as well as developing countries, although
it has long been a characteristic of the less powerful developing country governments.
22  Global23It is estimated to cost developing countries $140 million to implement just three of the
WTO agreements--customs valuation, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and intellectual
property rights (Rodrik, March/April 2001, p.5).  Beyond these flows, resources must be held in
reserve to support open-market policies.  In Peru, for example, the foreign hard currency reserves
held by the Central Bank are equal to about 1 percent of her annual gross domestic product
(Rodrik, March/April 2001, p.6).
24Of course, in a world free of internal and external conflict, military budgets would, for
most countries, be vast sources of funds for social programs.  Diverting just 10 percent of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s military spending in 1999 would have raised $700 million (HDR 2001, p.6)
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economic integration, as institutionalized in the WTO can be severely limiting of the economic
policy freedom of these countries.  If economic growth is to be stimulated, market deregulation
must be accompanied by policies that work toward market efficiency through competitive
structures and information flowing to all market participants.  An effective banking system,
private property rights, the enforcement of contracts, anticorruption policies, all based on an
efficient judiciary are critical if openness is to contribute to economic development.  In this
sense, countries with institutions that have not historically relied on open market policies (former
Soviet Union, Latin American State capitalism, Asian government-led development) or were
never particularly effective (a definition of underdevelopment), experienced the greatest
constraints on development policies (Rodrik, November 1999; Rodrik, March/April 2001).
The conditionalities of the WB and IMF limit funds for social investment.  The cost of meeting
WTO requirements can be large.
23  In these respects, global economic integration limits national
economic freedom and, through resource limitations, social policy freedom.
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In addition to these more stringent economic constraints on developing country economic and
social policies, their voices in international networks are not as loud.  They are excluded from
many groups such as the G7; their lack of input into the WTO has been a source of great friction.
2.  Market Power and Multinational Firms
Clearly, there has been a shift in power from the nation state to the global financial and economic
markets.  The limitations imposed on individual governmental policies by the international
markets also apply to multinational corporations.  Here, the power shift is to the marketplace, not
directly to the institutions of economic globalization, the multinational firms.  In a major way,
multinationals are subject to, not determinants of, market conditions.  Enabled by the nation state
and implemented by multinational firms, markets now constrain the policy freedom for both
groups.  
3.  The Promise of Global Governance Networks
To what extent can global governance assume the regulatory function from the declining policy
freedom of national governments?   Based on the earlier discussion of governance networks,
although improving in organization and power, these networks cannot be expected to provide the
coherent regulation desired of a nation state or its enforcement.  Väyrynen describes the rules of
global governance in terms of “soft law.”  
“In general, one can predict an increase in flexible and diverse, but less binding
international rules (as manifested by the growing role of ‘soft law’).  Actors often resort 
to soft law in the absence of well-defined institutions and precedents, or because of the
sheer complexity of the issues....  Compliance with transnational norms is achieved more54
by monitoring, persuasion, and capacity-building than by formal enforcement mechanisms”
(Väyrynen, forthcoming, pp.234-235).
  
Beyond the network constraints of soft law, the influence of multinationals is evident in these
networks.  Following an extensive analysis of private authority, Cutler, Haufler, and Porter
conclude:
We started out this volume by asking “do corporations rule the world?”  We end by
returning to that theme.  We argue that yes, corporations increasingly do establish
institutions that “govern” in the absence of or in coordination with governance
arrangements involving state at the international level (Cutler et al 1999a, p.370).
In their focus on governance networks, these analysts do not fully recognize the power of the
market and its limitations on corporate as well as national governmental and international
governance networks.
To summarize:   Embedded in the current capitalistic system is a serious social void.  The drive
of the faceless market is limiting policy freedom for both multinational and national governments
alike.  Global governance networks, although improving in reach and sophistication, are not yet
to the point of imposing social considerations, or economic constraints, on the market and its 
implementing institutions. Unencumbered, the current market pressures, and the associated social
void, endanger the prospects for peace.25In terms of systemic corporate governance, there is a functional distinction between the
business enterprise and financial institutions.  The economic role of the enterprise is to maximize
productivity with minimum risk.  The role of the financial institution is to channel resources to
those enterprises with acceptable risk/return combinations.  In this context, corporate governance
applies to the productive enterprise operating within the financial markets as a component of its
governance system.  
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III.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
Corporate governance has to do with who controls the activities of the firm and for what purpose. 
Governance has two components.  One is the limits on corporate behavior imposed by the
globalizing system.
25   As implemented in different countries, market pressures are supported and
constrained in different ways--a uniqueness defined as different kinds of capitalism.  The second
component of corporate governance is the direction of the firm’s activities provided by corporate
governing boards and management within the confines of global markets and regulatory systems. 
There is intense debate as to the appropriate objectives to be pursued by these groups responsible
for corporate behavior.
For the individual enterprise, systemic pressures impose limits that will be defined as a
Managerial Area of Discretion.  Within these external boundaries, judgment as to the appropriate
managerial behavior is based on the alternative theories of the firm.
A.  External Systemic Determinants of Corporate Activities
1.  Governance Regimes
The governance of the firm that obtains in any national environment is dependent upon cultural56
attitudes, the role of the markets, and the regulatory regimes that evolve.  Every market economy
has its own distinct form of capitalism.  These forms have changed with the shift from
government-led to market-led development.  
A unique form of government-led development was created in Latin America.  These systems
were typified by large public sectors and governmental bureaucracies, extensive regulation, State
ownership of productive resources, and collaboration between State-owned and private
enterprises.  Governmental intervention was on a case-by-case basis (Jameson and Rivera). 
Similar systems developed in Asia although there was a stronger sense of ensuring that regulation
followed the market (Kim).   With globalization and the shift to market-led development, the
control dimension of these regimes has disappeared.
Two forms of capitalism are currently most in evidence in national market regimes (with the
notable exception of China):   Anglo-American Capitalism is named for conditions in the United
States and the United Kingdom.  Social Market Capitalism has evolved in continental Europe
with Germany as its prototype.
In Anglo-American Capitalism, economic interactions are competitive and adversarial; a great
deal of regulatory effort is directed toward market efficiency; labor legislation is relatively
nonprotective.  In the financial markets, there is a long history of institutional separation between26Whitman argues that the competitive pressures of the product markets and the
increasing power of investors are increasingly driving the action of the business enterprises.  She
describes it as a corporate shift from the socially oriented institutions of “managerial capitalism”
to shareholder maximizing organizations of “investor capitalism.” 
27Shareholder control is dominated by banks.  The cross ownership is typical between
banks and specific industrial corporate clusters.  The bank votes the share they own plus large
number of bearer shares held in trust.
28For a nuanced comparison of the “contracterian” corporate governance models of the
United States and the United Kingdom compared to the “communitarian” models of Germany
and Japan, see Fort and Schipani.  Also see Tavis (1997), and Monks and Minow who outline the
corporate governance models of 13 countries.
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bank commercial lending and equity investing.  While institutional investors are an increasing 
factor in the marketplace, the ownership of shares is broadly spread in highly liquid markets.
The aggressiveness of Anglo-American Capitalism is closely tied to the legal emphasis on the 
fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, and the relatively weak labor protection.  The financial
markets reinforce this emphasis.  The market for corporate control is stronger in the United
States than anywhere else in the world.  Dissidents from outside the company have ready access 
to shareholder proxy contests.  Unfriendly takeovers financed with low-grade debt are a common
feature, particularly in the 1980s.
26   
In Social Market Capitalism, economic transactions are collaborative and relational.  Labor and
communities are involved in corporate decisions.  Regulation is extensive.  Cross ownership
between banks and corporations is typical.
27  In this economic/political/social regime, “social”
actions are required.
28   Corporate governance in Germany is codetermined.  The supervisory58
board is equally divided between representatives elected by employees and those appointed by
owners.  A management board is appointed by the supervisory board to implement the decisions
of the board.  Elected works’ councils have extensive input into decisions that effect the workers. 
Thus, participation of German workers is embedded in the law.
In the global market, there is tension between Anglo-American and Social Market Capitalism. 
England, for example, refused to sign the Social Chapter of the European Union.  The
competitive aggressiveness, particularly of the United States, is forcing change in Germany. 
Cost pressures are impinging on the German worker-oriented social market.  Shortened work
weeks and sharing pay pressures as a means of dealing with redundancy, implemented with the
support of the works’ councils, can only go so far (Benoit, August 14, 2001, p.2).  In finance,
difficulties in raising equity capital are drawing German firms to the vibrant U.S. markets.  This
requires adherence to U.S. accounting and financial transparency requirements and exposes the
social market firms to the demands of large U.S. institutional investors.
Foreign investors are also creating a market for corporate control in Germany.  An unfriendly
takeover bid would not be expected to penetrate the cross equity holding, the structure of the
boards, and the works’ councils.  Not so.  When Britain’s Vodaphone successfully made an 
unfriendly bid for Germany’s Mannesman, the German government was unhappy but did not
intervene.  The fallout from this takeover continues (Meller).59
Convergence on the Anglo-American side has been in the legal requirement for shareholder
primacy and in investor behavior.  In the United States, “other constituency statutes,” passed by
various states to thwart unfriendly takeovers in the late 1980s, made it legally permissible for
directors to include the interest of nonshareholder constituencies in their decisions.  These state
statutes have broken the legal exclusivity of corporate shareholders (Tavis 1997, pp.110-111).  In
the financial markets, pressures have shifted from takeovers in the market for corporate control to
institutional investors as the dominant force.  These investors are not as myopically focused on
maximizing shareholder wealth as many financial theorists would desire.
The growing global dominance of Anglo-American Capitalism is part of the loss of national
governmental agenda power discussed above.  The resulting national and emerging global
capitalistic system imposes systemic constraints on the activities of the business enterprises.  
2.  Estimating Managerial Freedom
In a corporate governance model, these external systemic boundaries can be conceptualized as
forming a Managerial Area of Discretion--the area of decision flexibility available to enterprise
management (Tavis 1996).  In lineal programing terms, this would be the feasible region.  
Determination of the MAD is largely an empirical issue.  As noted, there are a host of factors
associated with globalization that direct the action of the firm:  Hyper competition in the global
product markets increases price and quality demands on the firm, limiting the margins and free29In this view, the drive of competition in the product markets would force management
to take advantage of weakened regulation.  Any managerial freedom that happens to survive
hyper competition and regulation is collapsed by the drive to maximize shareholder wealth.  
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cash flows of the enterprise; increased integration and information in the global financial markets
imposes stringent performance requirements; as an entity created by national law, a legal fiction,
national legal statutes and governmental agencies define the corporation’s rights and regulate its
responsibilities.  At the same time, these national economic, social, and environmental
boundaries have decreased, particularly in developing countries competing for investment and
jobs.  Advancements in global governance networks, although substantial in some social and
environmental arenas, is uneven.
29
Facing this environment, many corporate managers would argue that they are completely
subjected to market pressures, and have little policy freedom.  In fully efficient markets, as in the
case of many financial markets but few product markets, this is the case.  An exchange trader’s
actions are, for example, very much determined by the market.  In the product markets, a bulk
chemical plant that cannot differentiate its product, is severely constrained.  Alternatively, a
pharmaceutical firm, with a number of patented products, or a widely recognized brand marketer,
has fewer product market constraints.
Alternatively, activists would claim that multinational managers have far greater policy freedom. 
Their typical assumption is that managerial limitations on social or environmental action are self61
imposed, and that it is a matter of changing managerial behavioral, not the external market
pressures.  
The degree of market constraints (both product and financial markets) and the limits they impose
on managerial decision freedom are critical considerations in the external determinants of
corporate governance.  In reality, there remains substantial decision freedom (a substantial MAD)
for the multinational enterprise--a freedom that can be used by management to increase or to
diminish the social void.  Neither product nor financial markets are perfect.  Across these
extended enterprise networks, multinationals are dealing with a range of product market failures
--some grossly inefficient.  Moreover, national governments can regulate only a part of a
multinational’s activities and global regulation.  Hence, there is still ample room for
technological or product innovation--for positive net present value projects.  Multinational firms
have a unique cross border access to information, as well as highly sophisticated and
organizational ways to process that information and use it to their advantage.  Given the
uniqueness of each multinational enterprise, the Managerial Area of Discretion will vary among
enterprises and, indeed, can be unique for decisions within each firm.
In addition to these externally imposed pressures on managerial decisions, corporate governance
has to do with how enterprise boards and management use this discretion.  What are the
appropriate objective they should pursue?62
B.  Internal Determination of Corporate Activities
Since the MAD is a reflection of the constraints imposed by external sources, the moral
responsibility lies with the external sources imposing the constraints.  The management of the
firm has an ethical responsibility only to the extent that it is free to act (Kant’s ought assures
can).   There is a major normative disagreement over the appropriate objectives worthy of
managerial pursuit.  These can be expressed in terms of the financial shareholder theory of the
firm versus the stakeholder theory of the firm.
1.  The Financial Shareholder Theory
Financial theory views the corporation not as a definable entity but as a nexus of contracts.  The
corporation, as with all other institutions, is simply a collection of contracts.  Ronald Coase
introduced the concept of the firm as a nexus of contracts in 1937.  As the financial theory
developed and a separation between management and ownership evolved, the focus moved from
the entrepreneur as the contracting party to the contracts themselves.  Jensen and Meckling
envision all organizations as simply a collection, a nexus, of contracts.  
“It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve
as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.  This includes firms,
non-profit institutions such as universities, hospitals, and foundations, mutual organizations
such as mutual savings banks and insurance companies and cooperatives, some private
clubs, and even governmental bodies such as cities, states, and the Federal government,
government enterprises such as TVA, the Post Office, transit systems, etc.  
The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus
for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible
residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organizations which can generally be
sold without permission of the other contracting individuals (Jensen and Meckling,
pp.310-311).30For an extended analysis of these arguments, see Boatright 1999, pp.177-186.
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In financial theory the implicit contract with the shareholder has primacy.  This argument is
based on residual risk.  Among the parties contracting with the firm, the owners are the group
who bear the residual operating and financial risk of the corporation in that they do not have a
specific contract with the corporation that gives them priority of access to its cash flows.  The
owner’s contract with management cannot possibly enumerate all contingencies.  In the end,
owners must rely on the best efforts of management.  Since owners bear the residual risk with an
implicit contract, they should receive the residual return.
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2.  The Stakeholder Model 
Stakeholder theory is more of a description of who has a stake in the activities of the firm than a
normative theory.  In his seminal work, Freeman defines stakeholders: “A stakeholder in an
organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization’s objective” (p.46).   Stakeholders are generally associated with
some institution that can represent their interests to the corporation (and to the broader society). 
These can be formal organizations with well-established sets of rules and procedures that define
the individual rights and responsibilities, or informal groupings.  Figure 1 diagrams the
traditional stakeholders and their representing institutions.  The first concentric circle are the
stakeholders.  The second is their representing institutions.  The third concentric circle represents
the national state, or local governments as overarching stakeholders.  These governmental
agencies establish the rules that control the representing institutions as well as the enterprise64
itself, and are a major factor in the power relationships among the representing institutions.  The
final circle represents the global governance networks discussed earlier.
The South African King Report leaves the definition of “relevant” stakeholders to the individual
Board of Directors (The King Report, pp.8 and 20).  Its stakeholder classifications are helpful.
“Stakeholders” can be usefully categorised as follows:
1.1 Shareowners as providers of capital.
1.2 Parties who contract with the enterprise either as providers of input to its various
business processes and activities, or as purchasers of their output.  This would include, for
example, customers, employees, suppliers, sub-contractors, and business partners.
1.3 Parties who have a non-contractual nexus with the enterprise but who provide it with
its licence to operate and thereby exercise an influence on its ability to achieve its
objectives.  This class could include, for example, civic society in general, local com-
munities, non-government organisations (NGOs) and other special interest groups whose
concerns may be with issues such as market stability, social equity, and the environment.
1.4 The State as policy maker, legislator, and regulator of the economy generally and
specific sectors of it.  The State’s power, as opposed to mere influence, over the activities
of companies sets it apart from other parties with a non-contractual nexus.
In summary, stakeholders can be described as “those whose relations to the enterprise
cannot be completely contracted for, but upon whose cooperation and creativity it depends 
for its survival and prosperity (The King Report, p.113).
This is one of the few classifications that includes nontraditional groups (Section 1.3) and the
State as a stakeholder (Section 1.4). 
The stakeholder definition becomes a normative theory when tradeoffs among stakeholders are
addressed.  Prioritization among stakeholder needs and interests is one of the most difficult65
aspects of management theory.  Tavis approaches stakeholder tradeoffs in terms of boundaries. 
The minimum boundary is the threshold of stakeholder rights.  The core requirement for
allocating corporate cash flows is to ensure that no stakeholder rights are violated.  The upper
boundary is a limit on stakeholder demands determined by a process of fair negotiations. 
Stakeholder interest, beyond the threshold of their rights, should not be settled on the basis of
power.  A process of fair negotiations will mitigate these power outcomes.  Once the threshold
rights and negotiated limits are established the shareholders then would be entitled to the residual
return as in the financial model  (Tavis 1999, pp.417-420).  When values-based stakeholder
tradeoffs are included, the stakeholder model becomes a “Moral Management Model.”  
At core, the stakeholder theory is a model of contracts, with the same contractual basis as the
financial theory (Tavis 1999, p.417).  The difference is that the values-based tradeoffs among the
implicit and explicit contracting parties leads to more of a nesting of contracts than to a nexus of
contracts, and a concentration on the interrelationships of the entity. 
In recent work, the emphasis on individual contracts phases into a communitarian model of the
firm.  Melé applies the term nexus to the relationship among participants in a community.  
“The company involves unity among its members: They share in a common effort, are
ruled by a common authority, and work in cooperation.  In the firm, of course, there are
‘stakes’ but not only stakes.  Its members are also joined in nexuses.  These nexuses may be
for the sake of interests (economic or otherwise), psychological benefits (pleasant peers,
work climate, culture, and so on) or moral values (loyalty, solidarity with a company
mission, etc.).  All these nexuses contribute to company unity and, obviously, may be more
or less intense.  For all these reasons, we may call the company a community of people,
opened to more extensive communities” (Melé).31Boatright is dismissive of these efforts: “The ‘Moral Manager Model’ rests, I believe,
on the assumption that the business organization is the fundamental unit of analysis for business
ethics and that a business organization is directed by its top executives.  As a result, the central
task of business ethics becomes how to introduce ethics into corporate decision making, which is
to say the thought process of managers” (Boatright, October 1999, p.585).
Boatright notes that since this model applies to top managers who seldom explicitly incorporate
ethical considerations into their decisions, it has not been a success.  Boatright proposed instead a
“Moral Market Model’ where the ethical responsibility lies with all of the people in the business
and governmental organizations and, beyond that, to all those involved in the marketplace.
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The stakeholder model has received substantial support in the academic community and in
corporate credos or statements of value.  For example, Fort and Schipani include equity in their
definition of corporate governance.
“Corporate governance can be described as the top management process that manages and
mediates value creation for, and value transference among, various corporate claimants in
a context that assures accountability toward these claimants....  At the heart of good
governance, therefore, are methods for dealing with both efficiency and equity” (p.5).
The first statement of the Caux Principles is “The Responsibility of Corporations is Beyond
Shareholders toward Stakeholders” (Williams, Oliver, p.385).  The Johnson and Johnson Credo 
lists stockholders as its fifth priority.  “Our final responsibility is to our stockholders” (Tavis 
1997, p.392).  Social or environmental values consistently rank above shareholders in corporate
credos and value statements (Murphy 1998).
31
C.  Potential for Corporate Contributions
It has been argued that, within the intensity of the globalizing market and regulatory systems, the
multinational enterprise has a substantial area of decision freedom.  And, as demonstrated in the67
description of global governance networks, multinationals now have a voice in global
governance.  How these firms use their flexibility and their new voice in global governance
influences our global prospects for peace.68
IV.  GLOBALIZATION AND PEACE: THE ULTIMATE TEST
The ultimate goal is peace.  There are many linkages between the components of globalization
and positive or negative peace.  The multinational enterprise stands in the middle of  these
connections.  Three questions are to be addressed:  Does orderly interaction among individuals,
economies, and political groups enhance the prospects for peace?  Is there a connection between
democracy and peace?  How does the multinational enterprise fit into these relationships?
A.  Global Integration and Peace
Logic suggests that isolation creates conflict.  When individuals and groups are in close
communications with each other, and have mechanisms though which differences can be
resolved, there is a decreased likelihood that these differences will erupt into armed conflict.  The
globalization drivers and the resulting economic and political integration, along with the growth
of global governance networks, should lead to more peaceful settlements of disagreements.  The
decline in national policy freedom should also make wars among States less likely.
As noted, however, there remains a major social disconnect.  We observe fragmentation along
with integration--the persistence and expansion of the social void.  Kaldor posits this disconnect
as a key cause of what she terms “new wars.”  
“I argue that the new wars have to be understood in the context of the process known as
 globalization....  This process of intensifying interconnectedness is a contradictory process
 involving both integration and fragmentation, homoginization and diversification,
 globalization and localization....  Indeed, the wars epitomize a new kind of global/local
 divide between those members of a global class who can speak English, have access to
 faxes, e-mail, and satellite television, who use dollars or deutschmarks or credit cards, 69
 and who can travel freely, and those who are excluded from global processes, who live
 off what they can sell or barter or what they receive in humanitarian aid, whose move-
 ment is restricted by roadblocks, visas, and the cost of travel, and who are prey to sieges,
 forced to famines, landmines, etc. (Kaldor, pp.3 and 5).  
New wars are tied to what Kaldor describes as “identity politics.”  
“The goals of the new wars are about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or
ideology goals of earlier wars....  By identity politics, I mean the claim to power on the 
basis of a particular identity--be it national, clan, religious, or linguistic....  The new 
identity politics is about the claim to power on the basis of labels--insofar as there are 
ideas about political or social change, they tend to relate to an idealized, nostalgic,
representation of the past” (Kaldor, pp.6-7).  
The military tactics in these new wars are attempts to create fear and uncertainty in a climate of
insecurity and suspicion (Kaldor, p.9).  These tactics add to the insecurity of the social void.
Kaldor describes the privatization of violence as one characteristic of “new” wars.  As a result of
this privatization, “...the distinctions between external barbarity and domestic civility, between
combatant as the legitimate bearer of arms and the non-combatant, between the soldier or
policeman and the criminal, are breaking down” (Kaldor, p.5).  The use of security forces--Shell
in Nigeria or British Petroleum in Colombia--are destined for the violations of human rights even
when, or particularly when, they are tied to governmental military forces in an attempt to gain
legitimacy.  Protection of worker stakeholder security is offset against the violation of
nonstakeholder human rights.  The protection of private property does not trump the violation of
human rights.70
B.  Democracy and Peace
The connection between democracy and peace would seem to be straightforward.  In fact, this
relationship is as intricate as the connection between globalization and democracy.  On a national
basis, there is a strong argument that democracies do not go to war with one another.  There is
also a positive connection between democracy and the conditions for peace.  Finally, the focus of
our concern--Is there a the role for the multinational?
1.  Conflict Among and Within Nations
Democracies do not go to war with one another.  This idea can be traced to Kant.  His
“republican” state corresponds to what we would today call a liberal-democratic state (Marks,32This is the state of nature envisioned by Rodrik over the next century.  He sees the
development of a “global federalism” that grows out of current governance networks.  “Under
global federalism, politics need not, and would not, shrink.  It would relocate to the global level
(Rodrik, Winter 2000, p.183).
This pattern of Rodrik’s necessary conditions for federalism can be envisioned within the
structure of the current global governance networks.  
“The alliance will be underpinned by the mutual realization that both sets of interests are
best served by the supranational promulgation of rules, regulations, and standards.  Labor
advocates and environmentalists will get a shot at international labor and environmental
rules.  Multinational enterprises will be able to operate under global accounting standards. 
Investors will benefit from common disclosure, bankruptcy, and fiscal regulations”
(Rodrik, Winter 2000, p.185). 
Other necessary conditions imposed by Rodrik are a further reach:  
“A global fiscal authority will provide public goods and a global lender-of-last resort will
stabilize the financial system.  Part of the bargain will be to make international policy-
makers accountable through democratic elections, with due regard to the preeminence of
the economically more powerful countries.  National bureaucrats and politicians, the only
remaining beneficiaries of the nation state, will either refashion themselves as global
officials or they will be shouldered aside” (Rodrik, Winter 2000, p.185).
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p.551).  Kant extended these ideas to favor a league of sovereign republics (Owen,  p.385).
32  
Muravchik expands on Kant’s reasoning.  
“Kant reasoned that ‘Citizens...will have a great hesitation in ...calling down on 
themselves all miseries of war.’...   But this insight, though valid, is incomplete: 
It suggests a deeper reason for democratic pacificness.  Democracy is not just a 
mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self restraint.  At bottom, democracy 
is the willingness to resolve civil disputes without recourse to violence.  Nations that
embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more pre-
disposed to embrace it in their dealing with other nations” (Muravchik, pp.575-576).
This relationship between democracy and peace was empirically tested by Doyle.  Summarizing
Doyle’s work (Doyle), Marks notes, 72
“A separate ‘zone’ of peace does indeed exist among liberal states.  This zone has 
steadily expanded as the number of liberal States has increased.  Doyle has reported 
that throughout this period liberal States, while they have engaged in wars with non-
liberal States, have remained at peace with one another.  From this he has drawn the
inference that liberal States are likely to be more pacific than non-liberal States, not 
in general, but at least in their relations with other liberal states” (Marks, p.551).
In addition to a reasoned observation of democracy as a mechanism for avoiding conflict among
states, it is increasingly recognized as a means of preventing internal armed conflict.  As Franck
puts it, 
“Democracy does not provide a guarantee against civil war.  It merely provides the only
known process by which a genuine social discourse can proceed among persons by
legitimately representing the spectrum of opinion and interests in a community or in 
polis.  Without it, there can be decisions.  There can even be negotiation and discourse.  
But there can never be a genuine social convergence (Franck, p. 25).
Muravchik finds anecdotal empirical support through an analysis of some ten internal conflicts of
recent years (pp.577-579).
2.  Democracy and Development
The relationships between democracy, economic development, and peace are generally
supported.  There are two steps in the sequence: democracy and development, and development
and peace.  
As for democracy and development, a common counter argument--that a totalitarian government
is necessary to achieve economic development (commonly argued in relation to Singapore and
Chile) is not supported by the evidence.  “In fact, there is rather little general evidence that
authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial in33Rodrik makes this same empirical observation (Rodrik, May 2000)
34As noted earlier, Soroush argues that development must proceed democracy in Islamic
societies (Soroush, p.45).
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encouraging economic development”
33 (Sen, p.150).   Sen reasons that democracy will contribute
to a major component of development--poverty alleviation.  As quoted earlier: 
“Political and civil rights give people the opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general
needs, and to demand appropriate public action.  Governmental response to the acute
suffering of people often depends on the pressure that is put on the government, and this is
where the exercise of political rights (voting, criticizing, protesting, and so on) can make a
real difference.  This is part of the ‘instrumental’ role of democracy and political freedoms”
(pp.150-151). 
Rodrik finds an empirical connection between democracy and the stability of economic growth,
but not of economic growth itself.  “...participatory political regimes are associated with
significantly lower levels of aggregate economic instability” (Rodrik, May 2000, p.1).  He
reasons that this is the result of democracy creating dialogue where participants can see one
another’s views; that liberal democracies entail constitutional rules that curtail the power of the
majority to expropriate the minority; that democratic regimes produce compromise even when
there are no explicit constitutional rules to moderate behavior (Rodrik, May 2000).
In another study, Rodrik finds that wages improve as democracy deepens.  He notes, for example,
that in Mexico wages would increase 10 to 40 percent if Mexico were to achieve a level of
democracy comparable to the United States (Rodrik, August 1999).
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3.  Development and Peace
The connection between human development and peace would seem to be obvious.  Equitable
development that minimizes the exploitation and marginalization of major social groups surely
contributes to conditions for peace.  This relationship is based on the concept of “positive peace.” 
“It is important to be against war.  But it is not enough.  We also need to be in favor of
something--something positive and affirming: namely peace...positive visions of peace as being
greater than the absence of war” (Barash, p.129).  Positive peace depends on the conditions that
lead to a just society based on the elements of human development,  “...aspirations for human
rights, economic fairness and opportunity, democratization, and environmental well being and
sustainability” (Barash, p.129).  The denial of these rights leads to “structural violence.” 
“Structural violence has the effect of denying people important rights such as economic
opportunity, social and political equality, a sense of fulfillment and self worth, and access
to a healthy natural environment.  When people starve to death or even go hungry, a kind 
of violence is taking place.  Similarly, when human beings suffer from diseases that are
preventable, when they are denied a decent education, housing, and opportunity to play, 
to grow, to work, to raise a family, to express themselves freely, to organize peacefully, 
or to participate in their own governance, a kind of violence is occurring, even if bullets 
or clubs are not being used.  Society visits violence on human rights and dignity when 
it forcibly stunts the optimum development of each human being, whether because of 
race, religion, sex, sexual preference, age, ideology, and so on.  In short, structural 
violence is another way of identifying oppression, and positive peace would be a 
situation in which structural violence and oppression are minimized” (Barash, pp.129-130).
Empirically, however, we can observe that democracy and the social void have both increased
with globalization.  Where is the disconnect?  Part of it has to do with the overexpectations
associated with economic development.  Most of it is a function of the inequality associated with
global economic integration, not mitigated sufficiently by advances in shallow democracies or
the present loose web of global governance networks.75
C.  Potential Multinational Role
A persistent social void is a threat to positive peace.  As the instruments of market integration
and the institutions that link social groups across the world together through their products and
organizational networks, multinational enterprises are inextricably involved in the conditions for
positive peace.  They are the guarantors or the violators of stakeholder second generation
economic, social, and cultural rights.  Multinational enterprises are increasingly involved in
global governance networks and the potential contribution of these networks to positive peace. 
In these activities, multinationals are negotiating the constraints on their Managerial Areas of
Discretion.  Within the negotiated systemic constraints, individual firms have substantial
operating flexibility in allocating the resources of the enterprise.  Through an ethos of
participation and empowerment, multinationals can also contribute to democratiztaion
1.  Negotiating the Environment
Multinational corporations can use their new-found voice in global governance networks for
enhancing market mechanisms (ISO 9000), to pursue self interest (Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property), or to impose international social or environmental requirements
(International Council of Chemical Associations). The advantage of these broad global networks
for dealing with environmental and social issues is that the issues themselves are global, and are
influenced by global integration.  Global regulation is critically important to mitigate market
pressures, and to put all firms on an equal footing where no single enterprise will be exposed to a
competitive disadvantage.  76
To have an effect, these networks must meet the standards of transparency, accountability,
legitimacy, and authority of global governance outlined earlier.  Four examples from that
discussion:
CISO and the International  Council of Chemical Associations:
These networks come the closest to meeting the sequential standards of 
transparency to authority through the interactions in the network.  Beyond 
that, they derive legitimacy and authority from the active participation of
governmental bodies.
CFair Labor Associations:
This network could evolve to legitimacy and the authority associated with
obligation.  In the interim, however, even disclosure is an issue.  The current
plan is to disclose monitoring results only in summary form.  An argument
can be made that public disclosure of factory conditions would inhibit the
remediation purpose of the exercise--to correct the code violations without
eliminating the worker’s job.  In the longer term, transparency must evolve 
as the basis for accountability.
CBiosafety Protocol:
This protocol will test the potential social role of the WTO.  These negotiations 
will become public, and push the WTO to greater transparency and accountability.77
With the declining social policy freedom of the nation state, it increasingly becomes the role of
global governance networks to regulate the marketplace.  The porous, often interrelated
international networks, each dealing with separate dimensions of international activities, form a
loose web of rules.  They are not the coherent set of requirements ideally emulating from national
governmental bodies.  Even though they are often related to governmental bodies, governance
networks do not draw on the sovereign power of the nation state in the same way as national
regulation.  Still, many of these overlapping networks are moving toward the transparency and
accountability base of international legitimacy and a power of authority well beyond that of the
individual nongovernmental organization or business enterprise participant. 
2.  Operational Responsibility
To the extent that the constraints on multinational activities imposed by the international system 
contribute to workable integration, democracy, and filling the social void, they enhance the
prospects for global peace.  Within this external environment, each multinational enterprise is
itself a microcosm of global networks, with their reach extended through joint ventures,
subcontracting networks, and strategic alliances.  Given the number and size of these
multinational enterprises they represent a huge potential.  The communications, coordination, 
and control within these multinational networks would be the envy of any global governance
network.   78
Structurally these multinationals link an increasingly diverse cross section of international
societies with each other.  They individualize the global system.  They link the job loss of the
unskilled American worker with the new opportunity for a Mexican; connect the plastic shrink-
wrapped yacht in Florida to the unborn grandchild of the Brazilian chemical worker; give the
American consumer unprecedented access to good quality, low-cost apparel at the expense of
working conditions in China.  These are the tradeoffs of the multinational manager.
In stakeholder terms, the power of the strong stakeholders (those with the power to influence the
activities of the corporation) is translated to pressure on the weaker stakeholders who are
influenced by the activities of the firm through the enterprise linkages.  A good definition of
weak stakeholders are those whose rights are in danger of violation, the majority living in
developing countries.  They are weak because of the inadequacy of their representing institutions
(Figure 1).  In a developed country, these institutions (labor unions, the courts, regulatory
agencies) would represent all segments of society, including stakeholders of the enterprise. 
These institutions have the primary responsibility to guarantee the rights of their members or
those for whom they are legally responsible.  The role of government is to develop institutions
and to counterbalance the shortfall when they are inadequate.  When the local institution and
government fail, the responsibility is foisted upon the multinational.  Multinationals become
responsible for the second generation economic and social rights of their stakeholders within the
negotiated Managerial Area of Discretion.  The multinational is the institution with the linkages
to these stakeholders and the resources to assure their rights.35The emphasis here is on the operational impact of the enterprise.  While philanthropic
contributions are important, their effect on stakeholders is far less than the direct, secondary, and
even tertiary impact of operating decisions.
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Within their MAD, managers are free to choose a shareholder or a stakeholder model.  A neutral
management will allow the power of the strong stakeholders to collapse the MAD and impose
their interests on the weaker stakeholders.  In this case, the financial shareholder model would
dominate.
Based on published credos and value statements (Murphy 1998), however, management does not
subscribe to this neutral, shareholder position as noted earlier. In fact, shareholders are seldom
even mentioned.  To the extent that these published statements represent reality, management
would choose a stakeholder model, and an environmentally or socially responsive one
representing the weak stakeholders.
Numerous cases document the acceptance of this responsibility toward weak shareholders.  Some
of these cases are broadly publicized, such as, Aaron Feuerstein’s decision to rebuild Malden
Mills  after a fire (Cohen and Prusak, pp.24-25).  The major impact, however, is from the day-to-
day operating decisions of these corporations.  In these decisions, many managers are keenly
aware of the importance of empowering weak stakeholders as a means of ensuring the long-term
protection of their rights.  A staring point is to build an ethos of participation and empowerment,
and to support the development of local democratic representing institutions.  Operating
examples of these include the six cases reported in Part III of Tavis 1997, pp.169-338.
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Two caveats:   (1) Representing weak stakeholders through proactive social or environmental
programs is only the first step in eliminating exploitation.  The goal is to empower the weak
stakeholder to represent herself (Tavis 1997, pp.362-368).   (2) Individual multinational firms
cannot be expected to contribute much to the marginalized groups in the world, the areas where
absolute poverty is the most prevalent.  Multinational operational social proaction is exerted
through the firm’s operating linkages.  Beyond the extension of stakeholder boundaries in
developing countries where background representing institutions are weak, there is no operative
link between the individual firm and the large numbers of marginalized peoples.  Marginalization
is a systemic issue, contributions from multinationals are best exerted by way of global
governance networks. 
3.  Managing the Tradeoffs
In allocating resources within their area of discretion, there is a tension between the good of the
overall enterprise, and the importance of representing the rights of weak stakeholders.  On the
one hand, wealth remains a central goal of the business enterprise; the wealth of the firm
becomes the wealth of the shareholder in efficient markets; the wealth of the enterprise is what
supports stakeholder enhancement; the social contract with the firm is for it to enhance
productivity--the underpinning of wealth.  On the other hand, the threshold of stakeholder rights,
once determined, is immutable.81
These are not mutually exclusive alternatives.  Almost all socially motivated activities have some
wealth effect.  Enderle and Tavis provide examples.  
“Feeding workers in poor areas who come to work hungry will improve their productivity,
thus serving objectives that reflect responsibility in the economic realm.  Empowerment 
of workers on the shop floor will have the same wealth-enhancing effect as does the fair
treatment of suppliers or meeting the employee responsibilities.  Extending a plantation’s
water system into the local squatter community or investing in a hospital improves 
workers’ health and motivation with a resulting productivity and positive cash-flow impact. 
In the environmental realm, programs to reduce energy consumption can enhance wealth
(Enderle and Tavis, p.1141).   
At some point, however, the long-term cost of these rights supporting activities is greater than the
long term wealth enhancement.  
“Breakfast for workers can incrementally be extended to families as workers bring their
wives and children to share their nourishment.  Shop floor participation can be extended 
to the level of increasingly satisfied but not increasingly productive workers.  Community
services can be improved from water spigots, or minimum health facilities to an extensive
investment in modern social infrastructure.  Concerted energy reduction requires new,
expensive technology” (Enderle and Tavis, p.1141).  
This convergence of goals and tradeoff is conceptualized in Figure 2.  A way of viewing a
positive interaction between the local multinational business unit and indigenous NGOs is to
collaborate in moving the wealth apex up and to the right.  In feeding workers and their extended
families, for example, the local NGOs can help in organizing the breakfasts and publicizing the
activity locally, thus adding the wealth effects of good community relations to the wealth effect
of more productive workers--and bringing pressure on other local businesses.  Local NGOs are
rooted in the local communities and can complement the efforts of the multinationals.  36For an extended discussion of the measurement of the wealth in Figure 2, see Tavis
1997, pp.400-409 as well as Enderle and Tavis).
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The real cost of social action is the shaded area to the right of the apex.
36  This cost is an
important component of the managerial decision concerning how much to invest in protecting the
rights of their stakeholders within the Managerial Area of Discretion.
D.  The Peaceful Promise
There is  hope for peace in the negative sense of the national power to wage war, and in the
positive sense of the human rights empowerment of democracy and human development.  These
will not be a natural outcome of global economic integration or of the social policies of the State. 
Peace will depend on a deepening of national democracies; the transparency, accountability,
legitimacy, and authority of global governance networks; and on the action of the multinational
enterprise.83
V.  CONCLUDING NOTE
If the social void is to be narrowed, and the prospect for peace enhanced, proaction on the part of
the multinational enterprise is a necessary condition.  While other governmental, multilateral, and
institutions of civil society must participate as a sufficient condition, multinational enterprises
must be positively involved.
The argument of this paper has been that technologically driven economic integration will
continue with its positive and negative impacts; the associate democratization trend, although
fragile, will probably endure; the capability of global governance networks to assume a major
regulatory role from national governments is moving slowly.  This leaves us with few powerful
institutions to deal with globalization’s social fractionalization.  The globalizing markets of
which multinational firms are an integral part, while a marvel of productivity, contribute to the
social void more than to its healing.  In short, the pressures on corporate governance imposed by
the global system are effective in pressing economic efficiency with the social void as an
unintended consequence.
During the gradual shift from national government to global governance networks, or even to a
federation of national governments as foreseen by Kant and Rodrik, multinational managers must
take a positive, proactive social stance if we are to have peace.  Even as an organized minority,
multinationals can block the weak regulatory efforts of the present global governance efforts, an 
event less likely if multinationals are included in defining the anticipated regulation.  These firms84
have information, a point of view, and positive support to offer.  Multinational managers have
substantial freedom of action in allocating the resources of their enterprises within the systemic
constraints.  
The demonstrated, positive social and environmental contributions of many firms must be
continued, consolidated, and expanded across industrial sectors.  Codes of social and
environmental conduct, monitored and enforced, need to be extended from individual companies,
to national industrial sectors, and further to global governance networks.  Peace requires the full
moral imagination of today’s managers.
Peace within our capitalistic system cannot obtain without the positive social participation of
multinational managers.85
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